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Uncertain Fiscal Consolidations

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  • Huixin Bi
  • Eric M. Leeper
  • Campbell Leith

Abstract

The paper explores the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidations whose timing and composition are uncertain. Drawing on the evidence in Alesina and Ardagna (2010), we emphasize whether or not the fiscal consolidation is driven by tax rises or expenditure cuts. We find that the composition of the fiscal consolidation, its duration, the monetary policy stance, the level of government debt and expectations over the likelihood and composition of fiscal consolidations all matter in determining the extent to which a given consolidation is expansionary and/or successful in stabilizing government debt.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 2012_03.

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Date of creation: Jan 2012
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Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2012_03

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Keywords: government debt; budget reform; monetary-fiscal policy interactions;

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References

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  1. Wilbur John Coleman II, 1989. "Equilibrium in a production economy with an income tax," International Finance Discussion Papers 366, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  2. Den Haan, Wouter, 2008. "Comparison of Solutions to the Incomplete Markets Model with Aggregate Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 7019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Nora Traum & Shu-Chun Yang, 2010. "When Does Government Debt Crowd Out Investment?," Caepr Working Papers 2010-006, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  4. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde & Pablo A. Guerrón-Quintana & Keith Kuester & Juan Rubio-Ramírez, 2011. "Fiscal Volatility Shocks and Economic Activity," NBER Working Papers 17317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2008. "Political Economy of Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 619-641, 05.
  6. Ardagna, Silvia, 2004. "Fiscal Stabilizations: When Do They Work and Why," Scholarly Articles 2580047, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  7. Davig, Troy, 2004. "Regime-switching debt and taxation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 837-859, May.
  8. Perotti, Roberto, 1996. "Fiscal Consolidation in Europe: Composition Matters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 105-10, May.
  9. Lambertini, Luisa & Tavares, Jose, 2002. "Exchange Rates and Fiscal Adjustments: Evidence from the OECD and Implications for EMU," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp412, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  10. Carlos Arteta & Galina Hale, 2006. "Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector," Working Paper Series 2006-21, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  11. Benjamin Born & Johannes Pfeifer, 2013. "Policy Risk and the Business Cycle," CESifo Working Paper Series 4336, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Linnemann, Ludger & Schabert, Andreas, 2003. " Fiscal Policy in the New Neoclassical Synthesis," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(6), pages 911-29, December.
  13. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna & Francesco Trebbi, 2006. "Who Adjusts and When?The Political Economy of Reforms," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(si), pages 1.
  14. Alesina, Alberto & Perotti, Roberto, 1997. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 921-39, December.
  15. Benjamin Keen & Yongsheng Wang, 2007. "What is a realistic value for price adjustment costs in New Keynesian models?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(11), pages 789-793.
  16. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna & Francesco Trebbi, 2006. "Who adjusts and when? On the political economy of reforms," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2108, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  17. Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2000. "Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C93-108, March.
  18. Perotti, Roberto & Alesina, Alberto, 1997. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," Scholarly Articles 4553027, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  19. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Christos Shiamptanis, 2014. "Risk Assessment Under A Nonlinear Fiscal Policy Rule," LCERPA Working Papers lm0063, Laurier Centre for Economic Research and Policy Analysis, revised Jun 2014.
  2. Anna Sokolova, 2013. "Fiscal Limits and Monetary Policy: Default vs. Inflation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 39/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  3. Sokolova, A., 2014. "Sovereign Risk and Monetary Policy," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 56-82.
  4. Gerhard Glomm & Juergen Jung & Chung Tran, 2012. "Fiscal Austerity Measures: Spending Cuts vs. Tax Increases," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2012-594, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  5. Ricco, Giovanni & Callegari, Giovanni & Cimadomo, Jacopo, 2014. "Signals from the Government: Policy Uncertainty and the Transmission of Fiscal Shocks," MPRA Paper 56136, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Bertrand Gruss & Jose L. Torres, 2012. "Macroeconomic and Welfare Costs of U.S. Fiscal Imbalances," IMF Working Papers 12/38, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Apostolis Philippopoulos & Petros Varthalitis & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2013. "Optimal Fiscal Action in an Economy with Sovereign Premia and without Monetary Independence: An Application to Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4199, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Gliksberg, Baruch, 2013. "Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 285-304.
  9. Bernardi, L., 2012. "Heterogeneity of taxation in EA Member countries and some implications for EA fiscal governance," MPRA Paper 40050, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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