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Political Economy of Mechanisms

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Author Info
Daron Acemoglu
Michael Golosov
Aleh Tsyvinski

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Abstract

We study the provision of dynamic incentives to self-interested politicians who control the allocation of resources in the context of the standard neoclassical growth model. Citizens discipline politicians using elections. We show that the need to provide incentives to the politician in power creates political economy distortions in the structure of production, which resemble aggregate tax distortions. We provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run. If the politicians are as patient as the citizens, the best subgame perfect equilibrium leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear. In contrast, when politicians are less patient than the citizens, political economy distortions remain asymptotically and lead to positive aggregate labor and capital taxes. Copyright Copyright 2008 by The Econometric Society.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00849.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 76 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (05)
Pages: 619-641
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:76:y:2008:i:3:p:619-641

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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2007. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Panagiotis Chronis & Aspassia Strantzalou, 2008. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction: What is the Role of the Transaction Cost of the Tax System in Stabilisation Policies?," Working Papers 71, Bank of Greece. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ricardo J. Caballero & Pierre Yared, 2008. "Future Rent-Seeking and Current Public Savings," NBER Working Papers 14417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2007. "Political Economy of Mechanisms," Working Papers CAS_RN_2007_2, Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," NBER Working Papers 13915, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ricardo J. Caballero & Pierre Yared, 2008. "Inflating the Beast: Political Incentives Under Uncertainty," NBER Working Papers 13779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Felix Bierbrauer & Marco Sahm, 2008. "Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stefania Albanesi & Roc Armenter, 2007. "Intertemporal Distortions in the Second Best," Discussion Papers 0708-08, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2008. "Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000002192, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, 2009. "Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation," NBER Working Papers 15194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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