The Welfare State and Competitiveness
Abstract
In all industrial countries, fiscal policy is increasingly about redistribution. In this paper, the authors study redistribution across different types of agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation. They show that an increase in transfers financed by distortionary taxation has nonlinear effects on unit labor costs relative to the other countries, depending on the degree of centralization of the wage-setting process in the labor market. The authors find considerable empirical support for the model in a sample of fourteen OECD countries. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 87 (1997)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 921-39
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Welfare State and Competitiveness," NBER Working Papers 4810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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