Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion
AbstractThis paper uses the rules of engineering as a rhetorical device to discuss why the international financial architecture needs a structured mechanism for dealing with sovereign insolvency. The paper suggests that the most important problem with the statusquo relates to delayed defaults and sketches a proposal aimed at mitigating this problem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies in its series IHEID Working Papers with number 03-2013.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 13 Feb 2013
Date of revision:
Sovereign debt; Sovereign default;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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