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Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF

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Powell, Andrew
Arozamena, Leandro

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Money and Finance.

Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 7 (December)
Pages: 1041-1063
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:22:y:2003:i:7:p:1041-1063

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30443

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eichengreen, Barry & Ruehl, Christoph, 2000. "The Bail-In Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means," CEPR Discussion Papers 2427, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Stanley Fischer, 1999. "On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 85-104, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Michael P. Dooley, 2000. "Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?," NBER Working Papers 7531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Eduardo Fernandez-Arias & Andrew Powell & Alessandro Rebucci, 2009. "The Multilateral Response to the Global Crisis: Rationale, Modalities, and Feasibility," RES Working Papers 4629, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ilan Noy, 2004. "Do IMF Bailouts Result in Moral Hazard? An Events-Study Approach," Working Papers 200402, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Goderis, Benedikt & Wagner, Wolf, 2009. "Credit Derivatives and Sovereign Debt Crises," MPRA Paper 17314, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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