This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Social Norms and Moral Hazard

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Dufwenberg, M.
Lundholm, M.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The probability of income loss depends on talent and effort. Effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence. The social norm requires more effort from individuals perceived as more talented. But talent is private information and individuals cuningly choose effort so as to manipulate the public perception of their talent. We analyze the workings of social insurance system in this setting.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number 1997-28.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:1997-28

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UPPSALA UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, S-751 20 UPPSALA SWEDEN.
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Email:
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: SOCIAL INSURANCE ; MORAL HAZARD;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Lindbeck, A & Nyberg, S & Weibull, J-W, 1997. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
    Other versions:
  2. Fershtman, Chaim & Weiss, Yoram, 1993. "Social Status, Culture and Economic Performance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 946-59, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dutta, Prajit K. & Radner, Roy, 1994. "Moral hazard," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 869-903 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gottfries, N. & Mccormick, B., 1990. "Discrimination And Open Unemployment In A Segmented Labour Market," Papers 460, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    Other versions:
  7. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-90, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Fershtman, C. & Weiss,Y., 1995. "Social Rewards, Externalities and Stable Preferences," Papers 32-95, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
  11. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Understanding welfare stigma: Taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 165-183, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alessandro Balestrino & Cinzia Ciardi, 2007. "Social Norms, Cognitive Dissonance and the Timing of Marriage," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers iewwp084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gary Charness & Antonio Cabrales, 2008. "Optimal Contracts With Team Production And Hidden Information: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 12-08, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Alessandro Balestrino, 2009. "Tax avoidance, endogenous social norms, and the comparison income effect," CHILD Working Papers wp15_09, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Alessandro Balestrino, 2007. "It is a Theft but not a Crime," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  11. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2000. "Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment," Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  12. Matthew Jowett, 2004. "Theoretical insights into the development of health insurance in low-income countries," Working Papers 188chedp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.