This paper examines some consequences of the assumption that individuals constrain morally their behaviour in games in general and in games of voluntary provision of public good in particular. Moral behaviour is defined in terms of a maxim which assigns one moral action to every player. Maxims themselves are defined with respect to a system of moral equivalence between individual actions referred to as a system of moral universalization.
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Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number
9731.
Length: 23 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:9731
Contact details of provider: Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
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