Is Unemployment Always Higher when Insiders Decide?
AbstractThis paper challenges the traditional view that unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the possibility of lower unemployment when insiders are decisive in the union than if outsiders were decisive in the union.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Danmark- in its series Papers with number 00-02.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Danmark; Centre for Labour Market and Social Research. Science Park Aarhus Wieds Vej 10C, 8000 Aarhus C, Danmark
Phone: +45 8942 2350
Fax: +45 8942 2365
Web page: http://www.cls.dk/
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UNEMPLOYMENT ; LABOUR MARKET;
Other versions of this item:
- Filges, Trine & Larsen, Birthe, 2000. "Is Unemployment Always Higher When Insiders Decide?," Working Papers 13-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Filges, Trine & Larsen, Birthe, 2000. "Is Unemployment Always Higher when Insiders Decide?," CLS Working Papers 00-2, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research.
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Farber, Henry S, 1978. "Individual Preferences and Union Wage Determination: The Case of the United Mine Workers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 923-42, October.
- Kiander, Jaakko, 1993. "Endogenous unemployment insurance in a monopoly union model when job search matters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 101-115, August.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-39, May.
- Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1989. "The Beveridge Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 1-76.
- Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April.
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