Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Capital controls or exchange rate policy? a pecuniary externality perspective

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gianluca Benigno
  • Huigang Chen
  • Christopher Otrok
  • Alessandro Rebucci
  • Eric R. Young

Abstract

In the aftermath of the global nancial crisis, a new policy paradigm has emerged> in which old-fashioned policies such as capital controls and other government distor-> tions have become part of the standard policy toolkit (the so-called macro-prudential> policies). On the wave of this seemingly unanimous policy consensus, a new strand> of theoretical literature contends that capital controls are welfare enhancing and can> be justi ed rigorously because of second-best considerations. Within the same the-> oretical framework adopted in this fast-growing literature, we show that a credible> commitment to support the exchange rate in crisis times always welfare-dominates> prudential capital controls as it can achieve the rst best unconstrained allocation.> In this benchmark economy, prudential capital controls are optimal only when the set> of policy tools is restricted so that they are the only policy instrument available.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-025.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Working Papers with number 2012-025.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2012-025

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166
Fax: (314)444-8753
Web page: http://www.stlouisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Foreign exchange rates ; Capital market;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia, 2011. "Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence: An Overview," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.), Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 1, pages 001-021 Central Bank of Chile.
  2. Bianchi, Javier, 2009. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," MPRA Paper 16270, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Bianca De Paoli & Anna Lipinska, 2013. "Capital controls: a normative analysis," Staff Reports 600, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  4. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2010. "Revisiting Overborrowing and Its Policy Implications," IDB Publications 6855, Inter-American Development Bank.
  5. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric R. Young, 2011. "Financial Crises and Macro-Prudential Policies," IDB Publications 27738, Inter-American Development Bank.
  6. Paul Krugman, 1999. "Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 459-472, November.
  7. Timothy J Kehoe & David K Levine, 1993. "Debt Constrained Asset Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1276, David K. Levine.
  8. Bruce Ian Carlin & Shaun William Davies & Andrew Miles Iannaccone, 2010. "Competing for Attention in Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 16085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Enrique Mendoza & Javier Bianchi, 2010. "Overborrowing, financial crises and ‘macro-prudential’ taxes," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Oct.
  10. Arnaud Costinot & Guido Lorenzoni & Iv�n Werning, 2014. "A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(1), pages 77 - 128.
  11. Nicolas E. Magud E. & Carmen M. & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "Capital Controls: Myth and Reality--A Portfolio Balance Approach," Working Paper Series WP11-7, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Gianluca Benigno & Huigang Chen & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Eric Young, 2011. "Financial Crises and Macro-Prudential Policies," Research Department Publications 4710, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  2. Gianluca Benigno & Luca Fornaro, 2013. "The financial resource curse," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51557, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  3. Huigang Chen & Eric Young & Christopher Otrok & Alessandro Rebucci & Gianluca Benigno, 2013. "Optimal Policy for Macro-Financial Stability," 2013 Meeting Papers 636, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Timothy J. Kehoe & Kim J. Ruhl & Joseph B. Steinberg, 2013. "What will happen when foreigners stop lending to the United States?," Economic Policy Paper 13-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Mitsuru Katagiri & Ryo Kato & Takayuki Tsuruga, 2013. "Prudential Capital Controls: The Impact of Different Collateral Constraint Assumptions," Discussion papers e-12-014, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2012-025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Xiao).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.