Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Capital Controls or Real Exchange Rate Policy? A Pecuniary Externality Perspective

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eric Young

    (University of Virginia)

  • Alessandro Rebucci

    (Inter-American Development Bank)

  • Christopher Otrok

    (University of Missouri/St Louis Fed)

Abstract

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a new policy paradigm has emerged in which old-fashioned policies such as capital controls and other government distortions have become part of the standard policy toolkit (the so-called macro-prudential policies). On the wave of this seemingly unanimous policy consensus, a new strand of theoretical literature contends that capital controls are welfare enhancing and can be justified rigorously because of second-best considerations. Within the same theoretical framework adopted in this fast-growing literature, we show that a credible commitment to support the exchange rate in crisis times always welfare-dominates prudential capital controls as it can achieve the unconstrained allocation.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2013/paper_641.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2013 Meeting Papers with number 641.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed013:641

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Fax: 1-314-444-8731
Email:
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bianchi, Javier, 2009. "Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle," MPRA Paper 16270, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. De Paoli, Bianca & Lipinska, Anna, 2012. "Capital controls: a normative analysis," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov, pages 1-36.
  3. Benigno, Gianluca & Fornaro, Luca, 2013. "The Financial Resource Curse," CEPR Discussion Papers 9489, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Anton Korinek, 2011. "The New Economics of Prudential Capital Controls: A Research Agenda," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 59(3), pages 523-561, August.
  5. Fabio Braggion & Lawrence J. Christiano & Jorge Roldos, 2007. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a 'Sudden Stop'," NBER Working Papers 13254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Jonathan David Ostry & Atish R. Ghosh & Anton Korinek, 2012. "Multilateral Aspects of Managing the Capital Account," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 12/10, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1992. "Debt constrained asset markets," Working Papers 445, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Paul Krugman, 1999. "Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 459-472, November.
  9. Nicolas E. Magud E. & Carmen M. & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "Capital Controls: Myth and Reality--A Portfolio Balance Approach," Working Paper Series WP11-7, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  10. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2010. "Overborrowing, Financial Crises and 'Macro-prudential' Taxes," NBER Working Papers 16091, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Bruce Ian Carlin & Shaun William Davies & Andrew Miles Iannaccone, 2010. "Competing for Attention in Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 16085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Ricardo J Caballero, 2010. "Sudden Financial Arrest," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 58(1), pages 6-36, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Exchange rate commitment always beats capital controls
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2014-01-24 15:08:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Timothy J. Kehoe & Kim J. Ruhl & Joseph B. Steinberg, 2013. "What will happen when foreigners stop lending to the United States?," Economic Policy Paper 13-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Davis, Scott & Presno, Ignacio, 2014. "Capital controls as an instrument of monetary policy," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 171, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed013:641. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.