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Central Bank Communication with a Financial Stability Objective

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Abstract

An endogenous financial crisis is introduced into the canonical model used to study central bank transparency. The central bank is endowed with private information about the real economy and credit conditions which jointly determine financial vulnerabilities. An optimal choice is made regarding whether to communicate this information to the public. A key finding is that the optimal communication strategy depends on the state of the credit cycle and the \ composition of shocks driving the cycle. From a policy perspective, this raises the possibility that central bank communication in the presence of a financial stability objective faces a time inconsistency problem.

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  • David M. Arseneau, 2020. "Central Bank Communication with a Financial Stability Objective," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-087, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2020-87
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2020.087
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    Cited by:

    1. Stijn Claessens & Ricardo Correa & Juan M. Londono, 2021. "Financial Stability Governance and Central Bank Communications," International Finance Discussion Papers 1328, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial stability report; Information disclosure; Survey of Economic Projections (SEP); Time inconsistency problem; Transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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