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Leaning Against the Wind When Credit Bites Back

Author

Listed:
  • Karsten R. Gerdrup

    (Norges Bank)

  • Frank Hansen

    (Norges Bank)

  • Tord Krogh

    (Norges Bank)

  • Junior Maih

    (Norges Bank)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the cost-benefit trade-off of leaning against the wind (LAW) in monetary policy. Our starting point is a New Keynesian regime-switching model where the economy can be in a normal state or in a crisis state. The setup enables us to weigh benefits against costs for different systematic LAW policies. We find that the benefits of LAW in terms of a lower frequency of severe financial recessions exceed costs in terms of higher volatility in normal times when the severity of a crisis is endogenous (when “credit bites back”). Our qualitative results are robust to alternative specifications for the probability of a crisis. Our results hinge on the endogeneity of crisis severity. When the severity of a crisis is exogenous, we find that, if anything, it is optimal to lean with the wind.

Suggested Citation

  • Karsten R. Gerdrup & Frank Hansen & Tord Krogh & Junior Maih, 2017. "Leaning Against the Wind When Credit Bites Back," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(3), pages 287-320, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2017:q:3:a:8
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    Cited by:

    1. Kockerols, Thore & Kok, Christoffer, 2019. "Leaning against the wind: macroprudential policy and the financial cycle," Working Paper Series 2223, European Central Bank.
    2. Ragna Alstadheim & Ørjan Robstad & Nikka Husom Vonen, 2017. "Financial imbalances, crisis probability and monetary policy in Norway," Working Paper 2017/21, Norges Bank.
    3. Grégory Levieuge, 2018. "La politique monétaire doit-elle être utilisée à des fins de stabilité financière ?," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 63-104.
    4. Michael D. Bordo, 2017. "An historical perspective on financial stability and monetary policy regimes: A case for caution in central banks current obsession with financial stability," Working Paper 2018/5, Norges Bank.
    5. Svensson, Lars E.O., 2017. "Leaning Against the Wind: Costs and Benefits, Effects on Debt, Leaning in DSGE Models, and a Framework for Comparison of Result," CEPR Discussion Papers 12226, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Saskia Ter Ellen & Vegard H. Larsen & Leif Anders Thorsrud, 2022. "Narrative Monetary Policy Surprises and the Media," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1525-1549, August.
    7. Andrew Filardo & Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul, 2016. "A quantitative case for leaning against the wind," BIS Working Papers 594, Bank for International Settlements.
    8. Hodula, Martin & Libich, Jan, 2023. "Has monetary policy fueled the rise in shadow banking?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    9. Gregory H. Bauer & Eleonora Granziera, 2017. "Monetary Policy, Private Debt, and Financial Stability Risks," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(3), pages 337-373, September.
    10. Claudio Borio & Piti Disyatat & Mikael Juselius & Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul, 2018. "La política monetaria cercada por un movimiento de pinzas," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 21(2), pages 004-044, August.
    11. David M. Arseneau, 2020. "Central Bank Communication with a Financial Stability Objective," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-087, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Claudio Borio & Piti Disyatat & Mikael Juselius & Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul, 2019. "Monetary Policy in the Grip of a Pincer Movement," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Álvaro Aguirre & Markus Brunnermeier & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Transmission Mechanisms and Policy Implications, edition 1, volume 26, chapter 10, pages 311-356, Central Bank of Chile.
    13. Górajski, Mariusz & Kuchta, Zbigniew, 2023. "Coordination and non-coordination risks of monetary and macroprudential authorities: A robust welfare analysis," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    14. Trent Saunders & Peter Tulip, 2019. "Cost-benefit Analysis of Leaning against the Wind," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp2019-05, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    15. Thore Kockerols & Erling Motzfeldt Kravik & Yasin Mimir, 2021. "Leaning against persistent financial cycles with occasional crises," Working Paper 2021/11, Norges Bank.
    16. François Gourio & Anil K. Kashyap & Jae W. Sim, 2018. "The Trade offs in Leaning Against the Wind," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 66(1), pages 70-115, March.
    17. Agur, Itai, 2019. "Monetary and macroprudential policy coordination among multiple equilibria," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 192-209.
    18. Robert Gmeiner, 2022. "The Chemistry of the Macroeconomy," Journal of Business Cycle Research, Springer;Centre for International Research on Economic Tendency Surveys (CIRET), vol. 18(3), pages 289-313, November.
    19. Leonardo Barreto, 2018. "Nonconventional monetary policy in a regime-switching model with endogenous financial crises," Documentos CEDE 16382, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    20. Nückles, Marc, 2020. "Interest rate policy and interbank market breakdown," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 779-789.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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