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Trece cuestiones sobre regulación en telecomunicaciones

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  • Diego Rodríguez Rodríguez

Abstract

Tres décadas después, el proceso de liberalización en las telecomunicaciones es reconocido como un éxito. Los servicios se prestan en régimen de libre competencia, la actividad minorista de las empresas no tiene regulación de precios o de otra índole, y solo se mantiene intervención regulatoria sobre el principal operador en algunas actividades mayoristas muy específicas, pues la mayor parte de la intervención inicialmente establecida se ha ido retirando progresivamente. Ello no evita que se mantenga una estructura concentrada en la provisión de servicios ni que el sector se enfrente a nuevos retos regulatorios.

Suggested Citation

  • Diego Rodríguez Rodríguez, 2021. "Trece cuestiones sobre regulación en telecomunicaciones," Studies on the Spanish Economy eee2021-05, FEDEA.
    • Handle: RePEc:fda:fdaeee:eee2021-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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