Public-good productivity differentials and non-cooperative public-good provision
AbstractWe explore the generality of Konrad and Lommerud (1995)'s Rotten Spouse Theorem. While the result holds for an arbitrary number of agents, it fails to hold for general technologies. We discuss some of the implications for CO2-emissions models.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by FEDEA in its series Working Papers with number 97-02.
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Other versions of this item:
- Eduardo Ley, 1996. "Public-Good Productivity Differentials and Non-Cooperative Public-Good Provision," Public Economics, EconWPA 9611001, EconWPA, revised 28 May 1997.
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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