Urban Transport Pricing Reform With Two Levels Of Government
AbstractThis paper analyses two challenges in the reform of urban transport pricing. The first challenge is the construction of an optimal package of urban transport pricing instruments assuming one benevolent government level that maximizes overall welfare. We examine the welfare gains from implementing in succession better parking prices, improved public transport prices and time varying tolling. It is found that parking and tolling are the most important elements of the optimal package and that the alternative policy instruments are sub-additive in their benefits. The second problem studied is the use of these pricing instruments by different government levels. We examine a case where an urban government controls parking fees and the regional government controls the tolling. Although both government levels have different objective functions, we find that the overall efficiency losses in the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are limited.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment in its series Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series with number ete0503.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven
Phone: +32-(0)16-32 67 25
Fax: +32-(0)16-32 67 96
Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ew/academic/energmil
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-03-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2005-03-13 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-PBE-2005-03-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-03-13 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2005-03-13 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard J. Arnott & Ronald E. Grieson, 1978. "Optimal Fiscal Policy for State and Local Government," Working Papers 291, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
- Edward Calthrop & Stef Proost, 1998. "Road Transport Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 335-348, April.
- Hutlkrantz, Lars & Armelius, Hanna, 2005.
"The Politico-Economic Link Between Public Transport And Road Pricing: An Ex-Ante Study Of The Stockholm Road-Pricing Trial,"
2005:8, Örebro University, School of Business.
- Armelius, Hanna & Hultkrantz, Lars, 2006. "The politico-economic link between public transport and road pricing: An ex-ante study of the Stockholm road-pricing trial," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 162-172, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Isabelle) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Isabelle to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.