This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Revenue Assignments in the Practice of Fiscal Decentralization

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez () (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies)
Abstract

Over the past two decades there has been an unprecedented move toward decentralized governance all over the world. These changes have taken special significance in many developing and transitional countries where centralized systems were perceived to have failed to deliver improved general welfare. The promise of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization is that it can strengthen democratic representative institutions, increase the overall efficiency of the public sector and lead to improved social and economic welfare for countries that decide to adopt it.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu/papers/ispwp0709.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper0708.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0708

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 404-651-1144
Fax: 404-651-4328
Web page: http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu/index.html
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Paul Benson).

Related research
Keywords: Revenue Assignments Fiscal Decentralization governance transitional countries

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Dahlby, Bev & Wilson, Leonard S., 2003. "Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 917-930, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wildasin, David E., 1983. "The welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with independent jurisdictions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 147-164, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Boadway, R. & Marchand, M. & Vigneault, M., 1998. "The Consequences of Overlapping Tax Bases for Redistribution and Public Spending in a Federation," Papers 9803, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
    Other versions:
  4. Gordon, Roger H, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 567-86, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ebel, Robert D. & Yilmaz, Serdar, 2002. "On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2809, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 45(3), pages 3. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Andrey Timofeev, 2005. "Choosing between Centralized and Decentralized Models of Tax Administration," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0502, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Arnott, Richard & Grieson, Ronald E., 1981. "Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 23-48, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.