IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ays/ispwps/paper0708.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Municipal Transfer System in Nicaragua:Evaluation and Proposals for Reform

Author

Abstract

For almost 20 years, the Nicaraguan authorities have been implementing a fiscal decentralization process to devolve an increase. ng degree of autonomy to municipalities. As a part of this process, and mainly due to the efforts of the Association of Municipalities of Nicaragua (AMUNIC is the acronym in Spanish), the first municipal transfers were approved in just 1999. Later, the funds available for the municipalities were increased gradually as a percentage of the General Budget (PGR), until in August 2003 the new Law of Municipal Transfers set this percentage at 4% of the total central government tax revenues in 2004, and stated that it should be increased at least by 0,5% per year up to 10% of the PGR in 2010. In 2005 the transfer program corresponded to 5% of the PGR, whereas in the present year the percentage increased to 6%. The Law of Municipal Transfers defines five targets for the municipal transfer program: 1) to promote the development of the diverse parts of the national territory; 2) to reduce the imbalance between the capacity to raise revenues and the cost of public service provision at the municipal level; 3) to stimulate local revenue collections and efficiency in municipal management; 4) to make possible the management and implementation of local policies of development and to allow local governments to administer national policies and development programs against poverty; and 5) to contribute to increased transparency in local management. In order to reach these objectives, the Law of Municipal Transfers also establishes four fundamental criteria to compute the amount of municipal transfers: 1) Fiscal Equity, meant to reduce the horizontal imbalances between municipalities; 2) Efficiency (or Fiscal Effort) in the collection of property taxes (IBI), meant to stimulate IBI collections with respect to the potential revenues in each municipality; 3) Population, which responds solely to the number of inhabitants of each municipality; and 4) Execution of transfers, which rewards the full disbursement of capital transfers. According to the Law of Municipal Transfers, Managua is entitled to 2,5% of the transfer fund, whereas 97,5% is distributed among all other municipalities in accordance with the four criteria. Each distribution criterion is weighted equally, and so the 97,5% of the transfer fund is divided by four and the total transfers for each municipality consist of the sum of the transfers received by each criterion. The potential per capita tax revenues, required to assign the transfers by Fiscal Equity has been calculated so far on a historical basis and now the authorities are considering the introduction of a new methodology, the MDPTM, developed and applied by the Boston Institute for Developing Economies (BIDE). The determination of the potential IBI collection, required to assign the transfers by Fiscal Effort, would also depend on this model. Although the MDPTM would constitute a great improvement with respect to the methodology used in the present, it is also a complex model that requires a great deal of information. In any case, even if the application of the MDPTM is feasible in the immediate future, the proposals provided in this report could easily incorporate its estimations.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Cristian Sepúlveda, 2007. "The Municipal Transfer System in Nicaragua:Evaluation and Proposals for Reform," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0708, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0708
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0708.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Michael Keen, 2000. "VIVAT, CVAT and All That: New Forms of Value-Added Tax for Federal Systems," IMF Working Papers 2000/083, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Dahlby, Bev & Wilson, Leonard S., 2003. "Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 917-930, May.
    3. Wildasin, David E., 1983. "The welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with independent jurisdictions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 147-164, March.
    4. Richard Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, 2000. "CVAT, VIVAT, and Dual VAT: Vertical ``Sharing'' and Interstate Trade," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(6), pages 753-761, December.
    5. McLure, Charles E. Jr., 2001. "The Tax Assignment Problem: Ruminations on How Theory and Practice Depend on History," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 2), pages 339-64, June.
    6. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Vigneault, Marianne, 1998. "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 453-478, June.
    7. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
    8. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Bob Searle, 2007. "Challenges in the Design of Fiscal Equalization and Intergovernmental Transfers," Springer Books, in: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Bob Searle (ed.), Fiscal Equalization, chapter 0, pages 3-10, Springer.
    9. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
    10. Jameson Boex & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2007. "Designing Intergovernmental Equalization Transfers with Imperfect Data: Concepts, Practices, and Lessons," Springer Books, in: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Bob Searle (ed.), Fiscal Equalization, chapter 0, pages 291-343, Springer.
    11. Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 1998. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Vietnam," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper9802, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    12. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2002. "On the Use of Budgetary Norms as a Tool for Fiscal Management," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0215, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    13. Richard M. Bird & Enid Slack (ed.), 2004. "International Handbook of Land and Property Taxation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3304.
    14. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    15. Richard Bird & Pierre Gendron, 1998. "Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(3), pages 429-442, July.
    16. Roger H. Gordon, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 567-586.
    17. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Andrey Timofeev, 2005. "Choosing between Centralized and Decentralized Models of Tax Administration (2005)," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0502, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    18. McLure, Charles E. Jr., 2001. "The Tax Assignment Problem: Ruminations on How Theory and Practice Depend on History," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(2), pages 339-364, June.
    19. Robin Boadway, 2004. "The Theory and Practice of Equalization," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 50(1), pages 211-254.
    20. Richard M Bird & Andrey V Tarasov, 2004. "Closing the Gap: Fiscal Imbalances and Intergovernmental Transfers in Developed Federations," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 22(1), pages 77-102, February.
    21. Richard M. Bird & Robert D. Ebel (ed.), 2007. "Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3864.
    22. Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McNab, Robert M., 2003. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(9), pages 1597-1616, September.
    23. Arnott, Richard & Grieson, Ronald E., 1981. "Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 23-48, January.
    24. Jonathan A. Rodden & Gunnar S. Eskeland (ed.), 2003. "Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262182297, December.
    25. Marilyn R. Flowers, 1988. "Shared Tax Sources in a Leviathan Model of Federalism," Public Finance Review, , vol. 16(1), pages 67-77, January.
    26. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Andrey Timofeev & Jameson Boex, 2006. "Reforming Regional-Local Finance in Russia," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6925, December.
    27. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 1998. "Principios Para Una Estrategia De Descentralizacirn Fiscal En Nicaragua," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper9705, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    28. Bob Searle & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2007. "The Nature and Functions of Tied Grants," Springer Books, in: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Bob Searle (ed.), Fiscal Equalization, chapter 0, pages 403-434, Springer.
    29. Roy Bahl & Bayar Tumennasan, 2004. "How Should Revenues from Natural Resources be Shared in Indonesia?," Chapters, in: James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Sri Mulyani Indrawati (ed.), Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    30. Ebel, Robert D. & Yilmaz, Serdar, 2002. "On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2809, The World Bank.
    31. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    32. Roy Bahl & Bayar Tumennasan, 2002. "How Should Revenues From Natural Resources Be Shared?," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0214, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    33. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
    34. Julio López Laborda & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Carlos Monasterio Escudero, 2006. "The Practice of Fiscal Federalism in Spain," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0623, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    35. Richard M. Bird & François Vaillancourt, 2006. "Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 6953, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jorge Martínez-Vázquez, 2008. "Revenue Assignments in the Practice of Fiscal Decentralization," Chapters, in: Núria Bosch & José M. Durán (ed.), Fiscal Federalism and Political Decentralization, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Santiago Lago Peñas & Jorge Martínez Vázquez, 2010. "La descentralización tributaria en las Comunidades Autónomas de régimen común: un proceso inacabado," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 192(1), pages 129-151, March.
    3. Boadway, Robin & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2012. "Reassessment of the Tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1063-1078.
    4. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Cristian Sepulveda, 2012. "Toward a More General Theory of Revenue Assignments," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1231, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    5. William Hoyt, 2005. "The Assignment and Division of the Tax Base in a System of Hierarchical Governments," Working Papers 2005-07, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    6. Hoyt, William H., 2001. "Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 491-516, November.
    7. Sotiris Karkalakos & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2007. "A spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses: evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(3), pages 782-811, August.
    8. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Cristian Sepulveda, 2020. "A Theoretical Rationale for the Fiscal-Gap Model of Equalization Transfers," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 76(1), pages 1-28.
    9. Keen, Michael J. & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2004. "Tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 397-407, November.
    10. Gangadha Prasad Shukla & Duc Minh Pham & Michael Engelschalk & Tuan Minh Le, 2011. "Tax Reform in Vietnam," World Bank Publications - Reports 26851, The World Bank Group.
    11. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, April.
    12. Bruno de Borger & Stef Proost, 2004. "Vertical and horizontal tax competition in the transport sector," Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(4), pages 45-64.
    13. Thierry Madiès & Sonia Paty & Yvon Rocaboy, 2005. "Externalités fiscales horizontales et verticales. Où en est la théorie du fédéralisme financier ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 115(1), pages 17-63.
    14. Esteller-More, Alex & Sole-Olle, Albert, 2001. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 247-272, April.
    15. Richard M. Bird, 2012. "Subnational Taxation in Large Emerging Countries: BRIC Plus One," IMFG Papers 06, University of Toronto, Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance.
    16. Crivelli, Ernesto & Volpe Martincus, Christian, 2007. "Horizontal and Vertical Tax Externalities in a Multicountry World," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 8/2007, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    17. Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2009. "Nonlinear Income Taxation And Matching Grants In A Federation With Decentralized In-Kind Transfers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 543-575, May.
    18. Revelli, Federico, 2003. "Reaction or interaction? Spatial process identification in multi-tiered government structures," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 29-53, January.
    19. William H. Hoyt, 2017. "The assignment and division of the tax base in a system of hierarchical governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(4), pages 678-704, August.
    20. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Cristian Sepúlveda, 2011. "Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America: A Policy Reform Perspective," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1108, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal decentralization; Municipal Transfer System; Nicaragua; local government;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0708. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Benson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ispgsus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.