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The Municipal Transfer System in Nicaragua:Evaluation and Proposals for Reform

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Author Info
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez () (International Studies Program. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University)
Cristian Sepúlveda () (International Studies Program. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University)

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Abstract

For almost 20 years, the Nicaraguan authorities have been implementing a fiscal decentralization process to devolve an increase. ng degree of autonomy to municipalities. As a part of this process, and mainly due to the efforts of the Association of Municipalities of Nicaragua (AMUNIC is the acronym in Spanish), the first municipal transfers were approved in just 1999. Later, the funds available for the municipalities were increased gradually as a percentage of the General Budget (PGR), until in August 2003 the new Law of Municipal Transfers set this percentage at 4% of the total central government tax revenues in 2004, and stated that it should be increased at least by 0,5% per year up to 10% of the PGR in 2010. In 2005 the transfer program corresponded to 5% of the PGR, whereas in the present year the percentage increased to 6%. The Law of Municipal Transfers defines five targets for the municipal transfer program: 1) to promote the development of the diverse parts of the national territory; 2) to reduce the imbalance between the capacity to raise revenues and the cost of public service provision at the municipal level; 3) to stimulate local revenue collections and efficiency in municipal management; 4) to make possible the management and implementation of local policies of development and to allow local governments to administer national policies and development programs against poverty; and 5) to contribute to increased transparency in local management. In order to reach these objectives, the Law of Municipal Transfers also establishes four fundamental criteria to compute the amount of municipal transfers: 1) Fiscal Equity, meant to reduce the horizontal imbalances between municipalities; 2) Efficiency (or Fiscal Effort) in the collection of property taxes (IBI), meant to stimulate IBI collections with respect to the potential revenues in each municipality; 3) Population, which responds solely to the number of inhabitants of each municipality; and 4) Execution of transfers, which rewards the full disbursement of capital transfers. According to the Law of Municipal Transfers, Managua is entitled to 2,5% of the transfer fund, whereas 97,5% is distributed among all other municipalities in accordance with the four criteria. Each distribution criterion is weighted equally, and so the 97,5% of the transfer fund is divided by four and the total transfers for each municipality consist of the sum of the transfers received by each criterion. The potential per capita tax revenues, required to assign the transfers by Fiscal Equity has been calculated so far on a historical basis and now the authorities are considering the introduction of a new methodology, the MDPTM, developed and applied by the Boston Institute for Developing Economies (BIDE). The determination of the potential IBI collection, required to assign the transfers by Fiscal Effort, would also depend on this model. Although the MDPTM would constitute a great improvement with respect to the methodology used in the present, it is also a complex model that requires a great deal of information. In any case, even if the application of the MDPTM is feasible in the immediate future, the proposals provided in this report could easily incorporate its estimations.

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Paper provided by International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper0708.

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Length: 93 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0708

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Keywords: fiscal decentralization; Municipal Transfer System; Nicaragua; local government;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Dahlby, Bev & Wilson, Leonard S., 2003. "Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 917-930, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jameson Boex & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2004. "Designing Intergovernmental Equalization Transfers with Imperfect Data: Concepts, Practices, and Lessons," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0421, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wildasin, David E., 1983. "The welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with independent jurisdictions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 147-164, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & VIGNEAULT, Marianne, 1998. "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," CORE Discussion Papers 1998003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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  5. Gordon, Roger H, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 567-86, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2002. "On the Use of Budgetary Norms as a Tool for Fiscal Management," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0215, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 1998. "Principios Para Una Estrategia De Descentralizacirn Fiscal En Nicaragua," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper9705, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Robin Boadway, 2003. "The Theory and Practice of Equalization," Working Papers 1016, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Andrey Timofeev, 2005. "Choosing between Centralized and Decentralized Models of Tax Administration," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0502, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  12. Ebel, Robert D. & Yilmaz, Serdar, 2002. "On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2809, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  13. Richard M Bird & Andrey V Tarasov, 2004. "Closing the gap: fiscal imbalances and intergovernmental transfers in developed federations," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 22(1), pages 77-102, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Arnott, Richard & Grieson, Ronald E., 1981. "Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 23-48, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Richard M. Bird & Robert D. Ebel, 2005. "Subsidiarity, Solidarity, and Asymmetry," International Tax Program Papers 0509, International Tax Program, Institute for International Business, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. [Downloadable!]
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