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Revenue Assignments in the Practice of Fiscal Decentralization

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Author Info
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez () (International Studies Program. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University)

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Abstract

Over the past two decades there has been an unprecedented move toward decentralized governance all over the world. These changes have taken special significance in many developing and transitional countries where centralized systems were perceived to have failed to deliver improved general welfare. The promise of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization is that it can strengthen democratic representative institutions, increase the overall efficiency of the public sector and lead to improved social and economic welfare for countries that decide to adopt it.

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File URL: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp0709.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper0709.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0709

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Related research
Keywords: Revenue Assignments; Fiscal Decentralization; governance; transitional countries;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Dahlby, Bev & Wilson, Leonard S., 2003. "Vertical fiscal externalities in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 917-930, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wildasin, David E., 1983. "The welfare effects of intergovernmental grants in an economy with independent jurisdictions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 147-164, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Richard Bird & Pierre Gendron, 1998. "Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 429-442, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. BOADWAY, Robin & MARCHAND, Maurice & VIGNEAULT, Marianne, 1998. "The consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation," CORE Discussion Papers 1998003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Other versions:
  5. Gordon, Roger H, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 567-86, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ebel, Robert D. & Yilmaz, Serdar, 2002. "On the measurement and impact of fiscal decentralization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2809, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Arnott, Richard & Grieson, Ronald E., 1981. "Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 23-48, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Richard M. Bird, 2008. "Tax Assignment Revisited," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0805, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
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