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Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly

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  • Rupayan Pal

Abstract

How product differentiation as well as strategic managerial delegation affects optimal emission tax rate, environmental damage and social welfare, under alternative modes of product market competition is examined. It shows that, under pure profit maximization, the (positive) optimal emission tax rate is not necessarily decreasing in degree of product differentiation, irrespective of the mode of competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Rupayan Pal, 2009. "Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly," Working Papers id:2263, eSocialSciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2263
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Does partial privatization improve the environment," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2010-018, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.

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