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Delegation, market share and the limit price in sequential entry models

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  • Church, Jeffrey
  • Ware, Roger

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8P-3VW1T7P-J/2/880738cece3465106522fcd37b19ea31
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 14 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5 (July)
Pages: 575-609

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:14:y:1996:i:5:p:575-609

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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References

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  1. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1986. "Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(2-3), pages 115-118.
  2. Richard J. Gilbert., 1988. "Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency," Economics Working Papers 8895, University of California at Berkeley.
  3. McLean, Richard P. & Riordan, Michael H., 1989. "Industry structure with sequential technology choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-21, February.
  4. Roger Ware, 1991. "Entry Deterrence," Working Papers 837, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. Economides, Nicholas, 1993. "Quantity leadership and social inefficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 219-237, June.
  6. Gilbert, Richard & Vives, Xavier, 1986. "Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 71-83, January.
  7. Appelbaum, Elie & Weber, Shlomo, 1992. "A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 473-480, December.
  8. Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March.
  9. Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Stackelberg and Marshall," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 69-82, March.
  10. Franco Modigliani, 1958. "New Developments on the Oligopoly Front," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 215.
  11. Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Sequential entry, industry structure and welfare," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1671-1687, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Trishita Bhattacharjee & Rupayan Pal, 2013. "Price vs. Quantity in duopoly with strategic delegation: Role of network externalities," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-010, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  2. Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 121-147, November.
  3. Rupayan Pal, 2009. "Delegation and emission tax in a differentiated oligopoly," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2009-007, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  4. Rahim, Afaf H. & Ierland, Ekko C. van & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 0. "Competition in the gum arabic market: a game theoretic modelling approach," Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, vol. 49.
  5. Rupayan Pal, 2009. "Delegation and Emission Tax in a Differentiated Oligopoly," Working Papers id:2263, eSocialSciences.
  6. Trishita Bhattacharjee & Rupayan Pal, 2013. "Managerial delegation in monopoly under network effects," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-009, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  7. Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence:A Reassessment of Limit Pricing," Working Papers id:1375, eSocialSciences.
  8. Appelbaum, Elie & Weber, Shlomo, 1992. "A note on the free rider problem in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 473-480, December.
  9. Georg Götz, 2002. "Spatial Competition, Sequential Entry, and Technology choice," Vienna Economics Papers 0215, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

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