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Oligopoly Limit Pricing

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Author Info
Kyle Bagwell
Garey Ramey

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/829.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 829.

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Date of creation: Apr 1989
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:829

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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1988. "Advertising and Limit Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 59-71, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. B. Curtis Eaton & Roger Ware, 1987. "A Theory of Market Structure with Sequential Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Matthews, Steven A & Mirman, Leonard J, 1983. "Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 981-96, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Kenneth L. Judd, 1985. "Credible Spatial Preemption," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 153-166, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. McLean, Richard P. & Riordan, Michael H., 1989. "Industry structure with sequential technology choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Steven A Matthews & Doron Fertig, 1990. "Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Discussion Papers 881, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Bonanno, Giacomo, 1987. "Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(1), pages 37-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1980. "Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 721-729, Autumn.
  12. Richard Schmalensee, 1978. "Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 305-327, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Waldman, Michael, 1987. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2), pages 301-10, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Gilbert, Richard & Vives, Xavier, 1986. "Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 71-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kyle Bagwell, 2006. "Signaling and entry deterrence: A multi-dimensional analysis," Discussion Papers 0506-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2003. "Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1080-1080. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Asher Wolinsky, 2000. "Game Theory and Industrial Organization," Discussion Papers 1307, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Bipasa Datta, . "Experimentation, Information sharing and Oligopoly Limit Pricing," Discussion Papers 99/34, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1990. "Advertising and Coordination," Discussion Papers 903, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Cesar Martinelli & Akihiko Matsui, 2000. "Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties," Working Papers 0003, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, revised Jul 2000. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Luis Granero, 2005. "Upward and Downward Limit Pricing: The Role of Post-Entry Competition," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1146-1146. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Byoung Heon Jun & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Anti-Limit Pricing," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000041, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Credible Ratings," Working Papers tecipa-219, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Bontems, P. & Meunier, V., 2006. "Advertising and price signaling of quality in a duopoly with endogenous locations," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200603, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
  11. Jorge Tarzijan, 2007. "Capital Structure and Entry Deterrence with Multiple Incumbents," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1590-1590. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Hidden Talents: Partnerships with Pareto-Improving Private Information," Working Papers 0613, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Working Papers 0520, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Cesar Martinelli & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Policy Reversals: Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties," Working Papers 9905, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, revised Jan 2000. [Downloadable!]
  15. Heijnen, P., 2007. "Informative advertising by an environmental group," CeNDEF Working Papers 07-02, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  16. Philippe Bontems & Valérie Meunier, 2005. "Advertising and Price Signaling of Quality in a Duopoly with Endogenous Locations," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Bijl, P.W.J. de, 1995. "Entry Deterrence and Signaling in Markets for Search Goods," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a Duopoly when there is Universal Private Information," Working Papers 0417, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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