Advertising Signals of Product Quality

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Advertising Signals of Product Quality

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Steven A Matthews
Doron Fertig

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Steven A. Matthews

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 881.

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Date of creation: Apr 1990
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:881

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Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling," Game Theory and Information 9403007, EconWPA, revised 30 Mar 1994. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992. "Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling," Working Papers 94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
- Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1989. "Oligopoly Limit Pricing," Discussion Papers 829, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1991. "Oligopoly Limit Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 155-172, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
F. Barigozzi & P. Garella & M. Peitz, 2002. "With A Little Help From My Enemy: Comparative Advertising," Working Papers 441, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1990. "Advertising and Coordination," Discussion Papers 903, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1992. "Advertising and Coordination," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-07, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1994. "Advertising and Coordination," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(1), pages 153-72, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin Peitz & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "- Exclusive Dealing Clauses Facilitate Entry," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Garella, P.G. & Peitz, M., 1999. "Exclusive Dealing Clauses Facilitate Entry," Papers 99-17, Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas.
Claude D. Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 1995. "Advertising as a Signal of Quality, A New Explanation," Working Papers 231, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
Bijl, P.W.J. de, 1995. "Entry Deterrence and Signaling in Markets for Search Goods," Discussion Paper 16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- de Bijl, Paul W. J., 1997. "Entry deterrence and signaling in markets for search goods," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-19, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin Peitz, 2000. "Exclusionary Practices and Entry Under Asymmetric Information," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1197, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

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