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Advertising Signals of Product Quality

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  • Steven A Matthews
  • Doron Fertig

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/881.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 881.

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Date of creation: Apr 1990
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:881

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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Phone: 847/491-3527
Fax: 847/491-2530
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1990. "Advertising and Coordination," Discussion Papers 903, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Daughety, Andrew & Reinganum, Jennifer, 1992. "Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling," Working Papers 94-17, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, revised 1994.
  3. Bijl, P.W.J. de, 1995. "Entry Deterrence and Signaling in Markets for Search Goods," Discussion Paper 1995-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Martin Peitz, 2000. "Exclusionary Practices and Entry Under Asymmetric Information," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1197, Econometric Society.
  5. Martin Peitz & Paolo G. Garella, 1999. "- Exclusive Dealing Clauses Facilitate Entry," Working Papers. Serie AD 1999-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. Kyle Bagwell & Garey Ramey, 1989. "Oligopoly Limit Pricing," Discussion Papers 829, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Müller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi & Yehezkel, Yaron, 2009. "Oligopoly limit-pricing in the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 373-393, May.
  8. Christian Schultz, 1997. "Limit Pricing when Incumbents have Conflicting Interests," CIE Discussion Papers 1997-17, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  9. Claude D. Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 1995. "Advertising as a Signal of Quality, A New Explanation," Working Papers 231, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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