Toward a Theory of Asset Subscription

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Toward a Theory of Asset Subscription

Author Info

Danyang Xie (International Monetary Fund)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Danyang Xie

Abstract

This paper develops an understanding toward a theory of asset subscription. When a firm needs to raise cash from an asset that is too large or too risky for a single individual or financial institution so that an auction method is not applicable, the firm may use a subscription scheme. In this paper, we discuss a Nash subscription (NS) scheme and a sequential subscription (SS) scheme. We characterize the optimal strategy when the value of the asset is known. The comparison between a NS and a SS is provided. The difference between an auction scheme and a subscription scheme is discussed.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 0303001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 03 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0303001

Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP;
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-03-10 (All new papers)
NEP-FIN-2003-03-10 (Finance)
NEP-MAC-2003-03-10 (Macroeconomics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1986. "Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(2-3), pages 115-118. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.