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Stackelberg and Marshall

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Author Info
Robson, Arthur J

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Abstract

This paper advocates a generalized N-firm Stackelberg model as a plausible testable alternative description of oligopoly. A pure-strategy equilibrium must exist for this model. The main result is that efficiency obtains in the limit as the scale of each firm is shrunk relative to demand. This is demonstrated for the case of U-shaped average cost and also for that of natural monopoly. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 80 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 69-82
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:80:y:1990:i:1:p:69-82

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  1. Miguel Fonseca & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 2006. "Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 443-456, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. AMIR, Rabah & LAMBSON, Val, 1999. "On the effects of entry in Cournot markets," CORE Discussion Papers 1999059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Mitraille, Sébastien & Moreaux, Michel, 2007. "Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Hierarchy in Two-Period Cournot Oligopoly," IDEI Working Papers 428, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  4. L. Lambertini, 1997. "Time Consistency in Games of Timing," Working Papers 302, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Marc Escrihuela Villar, 2008. "A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion," DEA Working Papers 29, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada. [Downloadable!]
  6. Luca Lambertini, 1996. "Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition," Working Papers 267, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Alexsandr Galegov & Andrey Garnaev, 2008. "How Hierarchical Structures Impact on Competition," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 2(3), pages 227-236, December. [Downloadable!]
  8. Steffen Huck & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 1999. "To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets," Experimental 9906002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Hans-Theo Normann, 1997. "Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 177-187, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Yuanzhu Lu & Sougata Poddar, 2006. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly and Private Duopoly - ‘Capacity- then-Quantity’ Game," Departmental Working Papers wp0605, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jianbo Zhang & Zhentang Zhang, 1999. "Asymptotic Efficiency in Stackelberg Markets with Incomplete Information," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-07, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  12. Rabah Amir, 2000. "Market Structure, Scale Economies and Industry Performance," Discussion Papers 00-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2009. "A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 137-147, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Zhiyong Liu, 2005. "Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(5), pages 345-350. [Downloadable!]
  15. Nick Feltovich, 2001. "Mergers, welfare, and concentration: Results from a model of stackelberg-cournot oligopoly," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(4), pages 378-392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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