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Is cash king for sales compensation plans? Evidence from a large-scale field intervention

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  • Viswanathan, Madhu
  • Li, Xiaolin
  • John, George
  • Narasimhan, Om

Abstract

The pervasive use of merchandise (i.e., non-cash) incentives in sales compensation plans is an empirical and theoretical puzzle given the supposed superiority of cash incentives in the standard theory (i.e., principal-agent models) and the scant, and contradictory empirical evidence. We conducted a large scale field intervention that switched 580 salespeople at a large frozen food manufacturer away from their cash plus “ merchandise points” bonus to a commensurate all-cash bonus. After controlling for salesperson, seasonality, year, and target effects, we estimated that sales, on average, dropped by 4.36%. Further, we estimated individual-level sales changes and effort changes to validate our incentive-effort-sales causal chain. Our results show that the top salespeople experienced the largest drops. A post-intervention survey of social and individual difference variables reveals that salespeople from households with more discretionary financial resources, and those who think more abstractly about the uses of cash income exhibited smaller reductions in effort and sales. While the absence of a control group prevents us from making strong causal inferences, this set of results nevertheless provides descriptive and suggestive evidence for separate mental accounts as the most promising explanation for the greater utility provided by merchandise incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Viswanathan, Madhu & Li, Xiaolin & John, George & Narasimhan, Om, 2018. "Is cash king for sales compensation plans? Evidence from a large-scale field intervention," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87158, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:87158
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87158/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Valerie Good & Douglas E. Hughes & Ahmet H. Kirca & Sean McGrath, 2022. "A self-determination theory-based meta-analysis on the differential effects of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on salesperson performance," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 586-614, May.
    2. Valerie Good & Douglas E. Hughes & Hao Wang, 2022. "More than money: establishing the importance of a sense of purpose for salespeople," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 272-295, March.
    3. Wyatt A. Schrock & Douglas E. Hughes & Yanhui Zhao & Clay Voorhees & John R. Hollenbeck, 2021. "Self-oriented competitiveness in salespeople: sales management implications," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 49(6), pages 1201-1221, November.
    4. Chung, Doug J. & Kim, Byungyeon & Syam, Niladri B., 2020. "A Practical Approach to Sales Compensation: What Do We Know Now? What Should We Know in the Future?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Marketing, now publishers, vol. 11(1), pages 1-52, June.
    5. Yanwen Wang & Muxin Zhai & John G. Lynch, 2023. "Cashing Out Retirement Savings at Job Separation," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(4), pages 679-703, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentives; non-monetary compensation; field experiments; salesforce; mental accounting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General

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