Voting on mass immigration restriction
AbstractWe study how immigration policies are determined under voting in a model where immigration redistributes income from wages to capital, migration decisions are endogenous, there exist border enforcement costs and preference for home-country consumption. We model the migration policy as a pure entry rationing rather than a necessarily porous screening system. Unlike the existing results of polarization, our findings show that preferences about frontier closure are distributed on a continuum going from total closure to total openness. Thus, the Condorcet winning immigration policy may well be an interior solution. Our results fit the real-life observation that both perfect closure and perfect openness are rare events. We also study the case of a referendum over two alternative policies and show that its outcome depends upon the location of the median voter with respect to the individual indifferent between the two alternatives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 2004-27.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2004-10-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2004-10-21 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2004-10-21 (Regulation)
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