Return Migration and Illegal Immigration Control
AbstractThis paper investigates the effectiveness of immigration control policies when the duration of stay of illegal immigrants is endogenous because they may return home voluntarily. It shows that return intentions matter. First, we find that spending on border enforcement can potentially increase the total amount of illegal labor in the receiving country. This is because, while fewer illegals enter the country, those who do enter stay longer. Second, in-site inspections reduce illegal labor, unless there is an amnesty: then, they can have the opposite effect. Third, fines on apprehended migrants have only limited effect.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London in its series Norface Discussion Paper Series with number 2012040.
Date of creation: Dec 2012
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Return Migration; Illegal Migration; Immigration Control; Immigration Policy;
Other versions of this item:
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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