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On financing the internal enforcement of illegal immigration policies

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Author Info
Rafael Tenorio (Department of Finance and Business Economics, University of Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA)
Gabriella A. Bucci (Department of Economics, DePaul University, 1 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago, IL 60604, USA)
Abstract

We introduce a government budget constraint into an illegal immigration model, and show that the effect of increasing internal enforcement of immigration laws on the host country's disposable national income depends on the mix of employer fines and income taxation used to finance the added enforcement. These issues are addressed under alternative assumptions about (a) the ability of host country employers to discern between legal and illegal workers, and (b) host country labor market conditions. Empirical evidence for the United States indicates that the employer sanctions program may have had a negative impact on disposable national income.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 65-81
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:9:y:1996:i:1:p:65-81

Note: Received October 7, 1994 / Accepted April 19, 1995
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Randall Filer, 1992. "The Effect of Immigrant Arrivals on Migratory Patterns of Native Workers," NBER Chapters, in: Immigration and the Workforce: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source Areas, pages 245-270 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. George J. Borjas, 1994. "The Economics of Immigration," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1667-1717, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Campos, Jose Edgardo L & Lien, Donald, 1995. "Political Instability and Illegal Immigration," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 23-33, February.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Splimbergo, 1999. "Political Economy, Sectoral Shocks, and Border Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 7315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Giuseppe Russo, 2008. "Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion," EERI Research Paper Series EERI_RP_2008_14, Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Chisato Yoshida, 2004. "The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 57-62, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Francesco Magris & Giuseppe Russo, 2004. "Voting on mass immigration restriction," DELTA Working Papers 2004-27, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
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