Coyote crossings : the role of smugglers in illegal immigration and border enforcement
AbstractIllegal immigration and border enforcement in the United States have increased concomitantly for over thirty years. One interpretation is that U.S. border policies have been ineffective. We offer an alternative view, extending the current immigration-enforcement literature by incorporating both the practice of people smuggling and a role for non-wage income into a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. We state conditions under which two steady state equilibria exist: one with a low level of capital and high amount of illegal immigration and the other with a high level of capital, but relatively little migration. We then analyze two shocks: a positive technology shock to smuggling services and an increase in border enforcement. In the low-capital steady state, the capital-labor ratio declines with technological progress in smuggling, while illegal immigration increases. In the high-capital steady state, a technology shock causes the capital-labor ratio to rise while the effect on migration is indeterminate. We show that an increase in border enforcement is qualitatively equivalent to a negative technology shock to smuggling. Finally we show that a developed country would never choose small levels of border enforcement over an open border. Moreover, a high level of border enforcement is optimal only if it significantly decreases capital accumulation. In addition, we provide conditions under which an increase in smuggler technology will lead to a decline in the optimal level of enforcement.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in its series Research Working Paper with number RWP 02-04.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Mark G. Guzman & Joseph H. Haslag & Pia M. Orrenius, 2002. "Coyote crossings: the role of smugglers in illegal immigration and border enforcement," Working Papers 02 01, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Segerstrom, P.S., 1990.
"Innovation, Imitation And Economic Growth,"
8818, Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory.
- Borjas, George J, 1987.
"Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 531-53, September.
- Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer Hunt, 1995.
"The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 23-44, Spring.
- Rachel M. Friedberg & J. Hunt, 1995. "The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country Wages, Employment and Growth," Working Papers 95-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- George J. Borjas, 1994. "The Economics of Immigration," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1667-1717, December.
- Valerie R. Bencivenga & Bruce D. Smith, 1995.
"Unemployment, migration, and growth,"
561, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 56-71, March.
- Lundborg, Per & Segerstrom, Paul S., 2002.
"The growth and welfare effects of international mass migration,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 177-204, January.
- Lundborg, Per & Segerstrom, Paul S., 1998. "The Growth and Welfare Effects of International Mass Migration," Working Paper Series 146, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research.
- Bond, Eric W. & Chen, Tain-Jy, 1987. "The welfare effects of illegal immigration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 315-328, November.
- Jim Dolmas & Gregory W. Huffman, 2004.
"On The Political Economy Of Immigration And Income Redistribution,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1129-1168, November.
- Jim Dolmas & Gregory W. Huffman, 1998. "On the political economy of immigration and income redistribution," Working Papers 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- James F. Dolmas & Gregory W. Huffman, 2000. "The dynamics of immigration policy with wealth-heterogeneous immigrants," Working Papers 00-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Gordon H. Hanson & Raymond Robertson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 1999.
"Does Border Enforcement Protect U.S. Workers from Illegal Immigration?,"
NBER Working Papers
7054, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gordon H. Hanson & Raymond Robertson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 2002. "Does Border Enforcement Protect U.S. Workers From Illegal Immigration?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(1), pages 73-92, February.
- Hanson, G.H. & Robertson, R. & Spilimbergo, A., 1999. "Does Border Enforcement Protect U.S. Workers from Illegal Immigration?," Working Papers 438, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
- James R. Markusen & Stephen Zahniser, 1997. "Liberalization and Incentives for Labor Migration: Theory with Applications to NAFTA," NBER Working Papers 6232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joseph H. Haslag & Mark G. Guzman & Pia M. Orrenius, 2004.
"Accounting for Fluctuations in Social Network Usage and Migration Dynamics,"
0410, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- Mark G. Guzman & Joseph H. Haslag & Pia M. Orrenius, 2004. "Accounting for fluctuations in social network usage and migration dynamics," Working Papers 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Mark G. Guzman & Joseph H. Haslag & Pia M. Orrenius, 2003. "A role for government policy and sunspots in explaining endogenous fluctuations in illegal immigration," Working Papers 03-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lu Dayrit).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.