Innovation, Imitation, and Economic Growth
AbstractThis paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady-state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined on the basis of the outcomes of R&D races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is enhanced, however, only if the steady-state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 99 (1991)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.