The dynamics of immigration policy with wealth-heterogeneous immigrants
AbstractIn this paper we consider a simple intertemporal economy in which immigrants, if admitted, bring heterogeneous amounts of capital. We show that under certain conditions there is a level of immigration which maximizes the economy's capital-labor ratio, and that this level of immigration is the preferred choice of a majority of the economy's citizens. We then characterize, in an overlapping generations setting, the dynamics of capital accumulation and immigration policy, which can include multiple steady state equilibria and a sensitivity of immigration levels to changes in the economy's technology growth rate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in its series Working Papers with number 00-06.
Date of creation: 2000
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- Jim Dolmas & Gregory W. Huffman, 2004.
"On The Political Economy Of Immigration And Income Redistribution,"
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02 01, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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