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A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals

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Author Info
Lauren N. Merrill () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)
Abstract

For an odd number of individuals Campbell and Kelly [2] show that over the set of profiles that admit a strong Condorcet winner, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice function. This paper shows that the situation is quite different in the case of an even number of individuals, and provides a characterization of strategy-proof social choice rules in this case.

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File URL: http://web.wm.edu/economics/wp/cwm_wp60.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 60.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 03 Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:60

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Related research
Keywords: majority rule Condorcet domain dicatorial rule stratefy-proof

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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  1. Kfir Eliaz, 2004. "Social aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 317-330, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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