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Strategy-proofness and weighted voting

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  • Campbell, Donald E.
  • Kelly, Jerry S.
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    Abstract

    A strict social welfare function (SSWF) that always yields an asymmetric binary relation with a single maximal alternative induces a social choice rule on its domain. It is known that if the induced rule is strategy-proof then it can also be generated by a SSWF satisfying non-reversal. This paper proves that a SSWF satisfying anonymity and IIAsatisfies non-reversal if and only if it is a weighted voting rule. If there are less than six voters then a SSWF satisfying neutrality and IIA satisfies non-reversal if and only if it is a weighted voting rule, but this equivalence does not hold for more than five voters.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

    Volume (Year): 60 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 1 (July)
    Pages: 15-23

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:60:y:2010:i:1:p:15-23

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

    Related research

    Keywords: Non-reversal Strategy-proof Weighted voting;

    References

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    1. Ron Lavi & Ahuva Mu’alem & Noam Nisan, 2009. "Two simplified proofs for Roberts’ theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 407-423, March.
    2. Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236 Elsevier.
    3. Asan, Goksel & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2006. "Maskin monotonic aggregation rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-183, May.
    4. Remzi Sanver, M., 2006. "Nash implementation of the majority rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 369-372, June.
    5. Kfir Eliaz, 2004. "Social aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 317-330, 04.
    6. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2006. "On the Equivalence of Coalitional and Individual Strategy-Proofness Properties," IDEI Working Papers 408, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    7. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
    8. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Campbell, Donald E. & Graver, Jack & Kelly, Jerry S., 2012. "There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 263-265.

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