Controlling the Public Wage Bill in Portugal: The Case of University Professors
AbstractPublic wages are a large share of the public budget in Portugal and, therefore, hiring freezes are a central feature of the efforts to control the public deficit. The system of public career advancement, however, may lead to increases in the wage bill even in the presence of hiring freezes. We estimate this wage drift effect in the case of university professors. We use a logit analysis with 1999 census data to identify the determinants of career advancement, to estimate the employment distribution in previous years, and to obtain the corresponding wage bill. We estimate that the annual wage drift is 2.6%, a figure well above the GDP growth rate and, therefore, we conclude that hiring freezes may be far from enough to stop the expansion of the public wage bill.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 36.
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jul 2006
Date of revision: 11 Aug 2006
public wages; budgetary restraint.;
Other versions of this item:
- Alfredo Marvao Pereira & Rui Manuel Pereira, 2008. "Controlling the public wage bill in Portugal: the case of university professors," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(13), pages 997-1000.
- H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-08-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2006-08-12 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-08-12 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2006-08-12 (Sociology of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Robert Gibbons, 1997. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Daifeng He) or (Alfredo Pereira).
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