Cournot competition among multiproduct firms:specialization through licensing
AbstractIn a duopoly where each firm produces substitute goods, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE) in its series DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi with number itemq0542.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Business and Economics, 5(3), 2006, pp. 201-210.
cross-licensing; patent pool; specialization; process innovation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-08-08 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-08-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-08-08 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2007-08-08 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2007-08-08 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2007-08-08 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-TID-2007-08-08 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mukesh Eswaran, 1994. "Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 689-708, August.
- Fershtman, C. & Kamien, M.I., 1991.
"Cross Licensing of Complementary Technologies,"
1-91, Tel Aviv.
- Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August.
- Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 25-30, May.
- Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
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