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Technology Transfer in Oligopoly in Presence of Fixed-Cost in Production

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  • Neelanjan Sen

Abstract

This paper discusses different possibilities of licensing between Cournot duopolists with a technology characterized by constant marginal cost and positive fixed-cost. It is shown that optimal fixed-fee and per-unit royalty can be negative. This implies that the licensor can subsidize the licensee in the equilibrium to license its technology even if they compete in the output market in the post-licensing stage. Moreover superiority of up-front fee as an advance on royalties is also identified. The firm having lower marginal cost and higher fixed cost prefers royalty licensing than licensing by fixed-fee, while the other firm having lower fixed cost and higher marginal cost sometimes prefers fixed-fee licensing. Interestingly, a firm that earns less profit in the no-licensing stage may become the licensor of its technology. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Neelanjan Sen, 2015. "Technology Transfer in Oligopoly in Presence of Fixed-Cost in Production," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 383-409, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:15:y:2015:i:4:p:383-409
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-015-0194-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hamed Jafari & Seyed Reza Hejazi & Morteza Rasti-Barzoki, 2016. "Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Including Monopolistic Manufacturer and Duopolistic Retailers: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 323-343, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Technology licensing; Oligopoly; Fixed-cost; L24; L13; D24;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity

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