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License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for Losers

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Author Info
Thomas Giebe (Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany. thomas.giebe@wiwi.hu-berlin.de)
Elmar Wolfstetter (Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University at Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany. elmar.wolfstetter@rz.hu–berlin.de)

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Abstract

This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers of the auction the option to sign a royalty contract. The optimal new mechanism eliminates the losses from exclusionary licensing without reducing bidders’ surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure royalty licensing. We also take into account that the number of licenses must be an integer, which is typically ignored in the literature.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich in its series Discussion Papers with number 96.

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Date of creation: Jan 2006
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Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:96

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Related research
Keywords: Patents; Licensing; Auctions; Royalty; Innovation; R&D; Mechanism Design;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1985. "On the Licensing of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 504-520, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Nancy T. Gallini & Brian D. Wright, 1990. "Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 147-160, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Beggs, A. W., 1992. "The licensing of patents under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 171-191, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kamien, Morton I. & Oren, Shmuel S. & Tauman, Yair, 1992. "Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 483-508. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-89, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hernandez-Murillo, Ruben & Llobet, Gerard, 2006. "Patent licensing revisited: Heterogeneous firms and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 149-175, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Aoki, Reiko & Tauman, Yair, 2001. "Patent licensing with spillovers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-130, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ines Macho-stadler & David Perez-castrillo, 1991. "Contrats de licences et asymétrie d'information," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 24, pages 08, Octobre-D. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Muto Shigeo, 1993. "On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 257-267, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Sen, Debapriya, 2005. "Fee versus royalty reconsidered," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 141-147, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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