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Optimal Licensing in a Spatial Model

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Author Info

  • CABALLERO-SANZ, Francisco

    (University of Valencia and Commission of the European Communities, Directorate General for Competition)

  • MONER-COLONQUES, Rafael

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • SEMPERE-MONERRIS, J.J.

    (CORE and IRES Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

This paper studies, in a spatial model. optimal licensing policies by first, comparing our results with the standard (non-spatial) licensing literature, and second, how results are affected if the patent holder can introduce a vertical restraint (exclusive territories). Contrary to standard results we find that royalties are superior to fees. Once the licensor introduces an ET clause, his profits are higher than when he uses either fees or royalties only. A conflict between private and social interests arises since consumers are better off when the technology is licensed via fees.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1994031.

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Date of creation: 01 Jul 1994
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994031

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Related research

Keywords: licensing; royalties; fees; exclusive territories;

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Cited by:
  1. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch & Cecilia Vergari, 2013. "Bargaining and delay in patent licensing," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 279-302, December.
  2. Rabah Amir & David Encaoua & Yassine Lefouili, 2013. "Optimal Licensing of Uncertain Patents in the Shadow of Litigation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00847955, HAL.
  3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00847955 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Ménière, Yann & Parlane, Sarah, 2008. "Decentralized of licensing of complementary patents: comparing royalty, fixed fee and two part tariff," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 383, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.

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