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Optimal Licensing in a Spatial Model

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Author Info
CABALLERO-SANZÊ SEMPERE-MONERRISÊJose, Francisco
MONER-COLONQUESÊ, Rafael
SEMPERE-MONERRIS, J.J.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1994031.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1994
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994031

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  1. Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kamien, Morton I. & Oren, Shmuel S. & Tauman, Yair, 1992. "Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 483-508. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, 1984. "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 27-38, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-89, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rockett, Katharine, 1990. "The quality of licensed technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 559-574, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sempere Monerris, Jose J & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J, 2001. "The Relevance of Bargaining for the Licensing of a Cost-Reducing Innovation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(2), pages 101-15, April.
  7. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Ines Macho-stadler & David Perez-castrillo, 1991. "Contrats de licences et asymétrie d'information," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 24, pages 08, Octobre-D. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zang, Israel, 1988. "Optimal license fees for a new product," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 77-106, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Sempere-Monerris, JosŽ J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Bargaining with Externalities: Licensing of an Innovation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 1997007, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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