Optimal Licensing in a Spatial Model
AbstractThis paper studies, in a spatial model. optimal licensing policies by first, comparing our results with the standard (non-spatial) licensing literature, and second, how results are affected if the patent holder can introduce a vertical restraint (exclusive territories). Contrary to standard results we find that royalties are superior to fees. Once the licensor introduces an ET clause, his profits are higher than when he uses either fees or royalties only. A conflict between private and social interests arises since consumers are better off when the technology is licensed via fees.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1994031.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 1994
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
licensing; royalties; fees; exclusive territories;
Other versions of this item:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00847955 is not listed on IDEAS
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent & VERGARI, Cecilia, 2010.
"Bargaining and delay in patent licensing,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2010077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00847955 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ménière, Yann & Parlane, Sarah, 2008. "Decentralized of licensing of complementary patents: comparing royalty, fixed fee and two part tariff," PIE/CIS Discussion Paper 383, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.