Subsidy In Licensing: Optimality And Welfare Implications
AbstractThis paper shows that subsidy can naturally emerge as part of the equilibrium strategy of an innovator of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly when the innovator is endowed with combinations of upfront fee and royalty. It is further shown that there are robust regions where the social welfare is higher in subsidy-based licensing compared to the regime where licensing involving subsidy is not allowed. The analysis is carried out for both outsider and incumbent innovators. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester, 2005..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Manchester in its journal The Manchester School.
Volume (Year): 73 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
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