Women and Illegal Activities: Gender Differences and Women?s Willingness to Comply over Time
AbstractIn recent years the topics of illegal activities such as corruption or tax evasion have attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of compliance. The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically whether women are more willing to be compliant than men and whether we observe (among women and in general) differences in attitudes among similar age groups in different time periods (cohort effect) or changing attitudes of the same cohorts over time (age effect) using data from eight Western European countries from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey that span the period from 1981 to 1999. The results reveal higher willingness to comply among women and an age rather than a cohort effect.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2006-15.
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
corruption; bribe; social norms; tax compliance; gender effect; age effect; cohort effect;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2006-05-06 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2006-05-06 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-PBE-2006-05-06 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2006-05-06 (Regulation)
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