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A Common Pool Theory of Deficit Bias Correction

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Author Info
Krogstrup, Signe
Wyplosz, Charles

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Abstract

The budget deficit bias is modeled as the result of a domestic common pool problem and of an international externality. Along with Piguvian taxes, a number of policy measures are examined and welfare-ranked: deficit ceilings, golden rules and delegation. In general, the combination of delegation and an optimally-set deficit ceiling deliver the social optimum, even if the deficit ceiling is not credible.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5866.

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Date of creation: Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5866

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Related research
Keywords: common pool; deficit bias; fiscal institutions; fiscal restraints; fiscal rules; stability pact;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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Cited by:
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  1. Roel M.W.J. Beetsma & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2007. "Partisan Public Investment and Debt: The Case for Fiscal Restrictions," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/37, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mark Hallerberg & Guntram Wolff, 2008. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 379-396, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Signe Krogstruo & Sébastien Wälti, 2009. "Enfranchisement and budget deficits: a theoretical note," HEI Working Papers 01-2009, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]
  4. Stähler, Nikolai, 2007. "Taxing deficits to restrain government spending and foster capital accumulation," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2007,26, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  6. Beetsma, Roel & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2007. "The Political Economy of Public Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6090, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Sébastien Wälti & Signe Krogstrup, 2006. "Women and budget deficits," Trinity Economics Papers tep0307, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 07/171, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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