Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?
AbstractVisiting Bruegel Scholar, Xavier Debrun, discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bruegel in its series Working Papers with number 48.
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Anna Iara & Guntram B. Wolff, 2011. "Rules and risk in the euro area," Working Papers 615, Bruegel.
- Panagiotis Chronis & Aspassia Strantzalou, 2008. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction: What is the Role of the Transaction Cost of the Tax System in Stabilisation Policies?," Working Papers 71, Bank of Greece.
- Ebert, Werner & Eckardt, Martina, 2011.
"Wirtschafts- und finanzpolitische Koordinierung in der EU – Erfahrungen aus einem Jahrzehnt Politikkoordinierung
[Public policy coordination in the EU - experiences from one decade of policy coor," MPRA Paper 29281, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Melecky, Ales & Skutova, Marketa, 2011.
"Fiskální pravidla v zemích Visegrádské čtyřky
[Fiscal Rules in the Visegrad Countries]," MPRA Paper 34028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pessoa, Argentino, 2011. "The Euro Area sovereign debt crisis: Some implications of its systemic dimension," MPRA Paper 35328, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruegel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.