We develop a model in which multinational investors decide about the modes of organization, the locations of production, and the markets to be served. Foreign investments are driven by market-seeking and cost-reducing motives. We further assume that investors face costs of control that vary among sectors and increase in distance. The results show that (i) production intensive sectors are more likely to operate a foreign business independent of the investment motive, (ii) that distance may have a non-monotonous effect on the likelihood of horizontal investments, and (iii) that globalization, if understood as reducing distance, leads to more integration.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
5592.
Christian Mugele & Monika Schnitzer, 2006.
"Organization of Multinational Activities and Ownership Structure,"
Discussion Papers
98, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
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Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002.
"Outsourcing versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium,"
Working Papers
148, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
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Thomas Müller & Monika Schnitzer, 2005.
"Technology Transfer and Spillovers in International Joint Ventures,"
Discussion Papers
84, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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