Control Allocation, Revenue Sharing, And Joint Ownership
AbstractThis article develops a two-period double moral hazard model with incomplete contracting to explore the implication of a possible adverse effect of unilateral control on the optimal revenue sharing and control allocation in a joint venture. We identify conditions under which joint ownership and control become optimal when unilateral control gives the controlling party opportunities to inefficiently extract private benefits at the expense of the joint revenue. Moreover, this adverse consequence of control may also lead to the separation of share ownership and control, i.e., it may be optimal for the minority owner to have the control rights. Copyright 2005 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 46 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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- Takanori Adachi, 2010. "Ownership Structure as a Continuous Variable: A Note on Joint Ownership in the Grossman-Hart-Moore Theory of the Firm," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2112-2118.
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