Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production

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Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production

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Grossman, Gene
Helpman, Elhanan

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Abstract

We develop a model in which heterogeneous firms in an industry choose their modes of organization and the location of their subsidiaries or suppliers. We assume that the principals of a firm are constrained in the nature of the contracts they can write with suppliers or employees. Our main result concerns the sorting of firms with different productivity levels into different organizational forms. We use the model to examine the implications of falling trade costs for the relevant prevalence of outsourcing and foreign direct investment.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3737.

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Date of creation: Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3737

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Article
- Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 2004. "Managerial incentives and the international organization of production," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 237-262, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Elhanan Helpman & Gene M. Grossman, 2002. "Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production," NBER Working Papers 9403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production," Working Papers 147, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.. [Downloadable!]
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Managerial Incentives and the International Organization of Production," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1987, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-03-14 (All new papers)
NEP-IND-2003-03-14 (Industrial Organization)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 2002. "Outsourcing in a Global Economy," Papers 218, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
Other versions:
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Outsourcing in a Global Economy?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1966, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Outsourcing in a Global Economy," NBER Working Papers 8728, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 2002. "Outsourcing in a Global Economy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3165, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Outsourcing in a Global Economy," Working Papers 149, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.. [Downloadable!]
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2005. "Outsourcing in a Global Economy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 72(1), pages 135-159, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
David Hummels & Dana Rapoport & Kei-Mu Yi, 1998. "Vertical specialization and the changing nature of world trade," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jun, pages 79-99. [Downloadable!]
Robert C. Feenstra, . "Integration Of Trade And Disintegration Of Production In The Global Economy," Department of Economics 98-06, California Davis - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Feenstra, Robert C, 1998. "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 31-50, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jose Campa & Linda S. Goldberg, 1997. "The evolving external orientation of manufacturing: a profile of four countries," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Jul, pages 53-81. [Downloadable!]
Chu-Chia S. Lin & Ivan P.L. Png, 2002. "Monitoring Costs and the Mode of International Investment," Industrial Organization 0207012, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Chu-Chia S. Lin & Ivan Png, 2002. "Monitoring Costs and the Mode of International Investment," International Trade 0210004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Chu-Chia S. Lin & Ivan Png, 2003. "Monitoring costs and the mode of international investment," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(3), pages 261-274, July.
Robert Feenstra & Gordon Hanson, 2001. "Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages," NBER Working Papers 8372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lawrence F. Katz, 1986. "Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation," NBER Working Papers 1906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
Hummels, David & Ishii, Jun & Yi, Kei-Mu, 2001. "The nature and growth of vertical specialization in world trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 75-96, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- David Hummels & Jun Ishii & Kei-Mu Yi, 1999. "The nature and growth of vertical specialization in world trade," Staff Reports 72, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
Horn, Henrik & Lang, Harald & Lundgren, Stefan, 1995. "Managerial effort incentives, X-inefficiency and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 117-138, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Horn, H. & Lang, H. & Lundgren, S., 1991. "Managerial Effort Incentives, X-Inefficiency and International Trade," Papers 507, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
Gordon H. Hanson & Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr. & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2001. "Expansion Strategies of U.S. Multinational Firms," NBER Working Papers 8433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Gordon H. Hanson & Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr. & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2001. "Expansion Strategies of U.S. Multinational Firms," BEA Working Papers 0002, Bureau of Economic Analysis. [Downloadable!]

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