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On Sustainable Pay-As-You-Go Systems

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  • Demange, Gabrielle

Abstract

An unfunded Social Security system faces a major risk, sometimes referred to as ‘political risk’. In order to account properly for this risk, the paper considers a political process in which the support to the system is asked from each newborn generation. The analysis is conducted in an overlapping generations economy that is subject to macroeconomic shocks. As a consequence, the political support varies with the evolution of the economy. The impact of various factors –intra-generational redistribution, risk aversion, financial markets, governmental debt- on the political sustainability of a pay-as-you-go system is discussed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4966.

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Date of creation: Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4966

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Related research

Keywords: intra-generational redistribution; overlapping generations; pay-as-you-go; political economy; risk; social security system;

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References

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  1. Georges Casamatta & Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series 259, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Peled, Dan, 1984. "Stationary pareto optimality of stochastic asset equilibria with overlapping generations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 396-403, December.
  3. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-88, September.
  4. Gabrielle Demange & Guy Laroque, 1999. "Social Security and Demographic Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 527-542, May.
  5. Chattopadhyay, Subir & Gottardi, Piero, 1999. "Stochastic OLG Models, Market Structure, and Optimality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 21-67, November.
  6. Azariadis, Costas & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2002. "Fiscal Constitutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 255-281, April.
  7. Jeffrey R. Brown & Olivia S. Mitchell & James M. Poterba, . "The Role of Real Annuities and Indexed Bonds In An Individual Accounts Retirement Program," Pension Research Council Working Papers 99-2, Wharton School Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania.
  8. Esteban, J.M. & sakovics, J., 1992. "Intertemp[oral Transfer Institutions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 172.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  9. Feldstein, Martin & Liebman, Jeffrey B., 2002. "Social security," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 32, pages 2245-2324 Elsevier.
  10. Kandori, Michihiro, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92, January.
  11. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
  12. Luisa Fuster & Ayse Imrohoroglu & Selahattin Imrohoroglu, 2003. "A welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1247-1274, November.
  13. repec:fth:calaec:03-98 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Political Equilibria with Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 41-78, January.
  15. Bohn, Henning, 1998. "Risk Sharing in a Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt9r2809f0, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  16. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Gabay, Daniel & Grasselli, Martino, 2012. "Fair demographic risk sharing in defined contribution pension systems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 657-669.

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