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A quantitative theory of social security without commitment

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  • Mateos-Planas, Xavier

Abstract

This paper investigates the determination of social security within a general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model where agents live for many periods, and replacement rates are determined through voting in each period by forward looking agents. The distinctive feature is the study of Markov equilibrium policy outcomes which do not rest on a commitment mechanism. Versions of the model are calibrated to the US economic, policy, and demographic conditions. Even in the absence of commitment, the policy preferences of tax-paying working-age voters sustain a positive level of retirement benefits. This follows because the current choices about social security will have, at the time when the current voters will retire, a positive impact on the political support for social security and on the returns to savings. On the other hand, the projected decline in the U.S. population growth rate causes the replacement rate and the tax rate to decline. This quantitative response without commitment differs from that in the case when policies are committed at time zero.

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  • Mateos-Planas, Xavier, 2008. "A quantitative theory of social security without commitment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 652-671, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:652-671
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    Cited by:

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    2. Tetsuo Ono, 2017. "Aging, Pensions, and Growth," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 73(2), pages 163-189, June.
    3. Yuki Uchida & Tetsuo Ono, 2024. "Generational Distribution of Fiscal Burdens: A Positive Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 65(1), pages 393-430, February.
    4. Martin Gonzalez-Eiras, 2011. "Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG models: a note," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 14(3), pages 549-552, July.
    5. Bishnu, Monisankar & Wang, Min, 2017. "The political intergenerational welfare state," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 93-110.
    6. Woodland, A., 2016. "Taxation, Pensions, and Demographic Change," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 713-780, Elsevier.
    7. Mateos-Planas, Xavier, 2009. "Demographics and the politics of capital taxation in a life-cycle economy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0909, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    8. Arnaud Goussebaïle, 2022. "Democratic Climate Policies with Overlapping Generations," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 22/374, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    9. Mateos-Planas, Xavier, 2009. "Demographics and the politics of capital taxation in a life-cycle economy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 909, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    10. Gustavo de Souza, 2022. "On Political and Economic Determinants of Redistribution: Economic Gains, Ideological Gains, or Institutions?," Working Paper Series WP 2022-47, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    11. Bielecki Marcin & Tyrowicz Joanna & Makarski Krzysztof, 2018. "Illusory Gains from Privatizing Social Security when Reform is Politically Unstable," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 24(2), pages 1-12, May.

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