Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,... or A, B, C?
Abstract
No abstract is available for this item.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 814577000000000361.Length:
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000361
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/
Related research
Keywords:This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-03 (All new papers)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hideshi Itoh, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 18-45.
- Alexis DIRER, 2001. "Interdependent Preferences and Aggregate Saving," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 63-64, pages 297-308.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2004.
"Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents,"
Cahiers de recherche
0419, CIRPEE.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2006. "Output and wages with inequality averse agents," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 399-413, May.
- Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude & Helm, Carsten, 2006. "Output and wages with inequality averse agents," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL) 33628, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet & Carsten Helm, 2004. "Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-47, CIRANO.
- Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001.
"The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982.
"A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-64, June.
- Pollak, Robert A, 1976. "Interdependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(3), pages 309-20, June.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2005. "Grading in Games of Status: Marking Exams and Setting Wages," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1544, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Cole, Harold L & Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1992. "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1092-1125, December.
- Englmaier, Florian & Wambach, Achim, 2010.
"Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 312-328, July.
- Englmaier, Florian & Wambach, Achim, 2005. "Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion," IZA Discussion Papers 1643, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Green, Jerry & Stokey, Nancy, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3203644, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Corneo, Giacomo & Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "On relative wealth effects and the optimality of growth," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 87-92, January.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2004. "Grading Exams: 100, 99, ..., 1 or A, B, C? Incentives in Games of Status," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1467, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ed Hopkins & Tatiana Kornienko, 2004. "Ratio Orderings and Comparative Statics," ESE Discussion Papers 91, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Robson, Arthur J, 1992. "Status, the Distribution of Wealth, Private and Social Attitudes to Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 837-57, July.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2005. "Grading in Games of Status: Marking Exams and Setting Wages," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1544, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2005.
Citations
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000361For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

