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Job Characteristics, Wages and the Employment Contract

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  • W. Bentley MacLeod

    ()

  • Daniel Parent

    ()

Abstract

This paper discusses some recent evidence exploring job characteristics and labor market conditions upon contract form. We find that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in observed employment contracts in the US, some of which may be explained by firms Nous analysons, dans cet article, le lien empirique entre les caractéristiques des emplois ainsi que les conditions macroéconomiques locales et la forme que prennent les contrats de travail. Nous observons qu'il y a une grande variété dans la forme des contrats régissant la relation d'emploi et que certains de ces contrats peuvent être expliqués par le fait que les firmes ajustent la façon de compenser leurs travailleurs aux caractéristiques des emplois. Nous trouvons également que l'utilisation de bonis est plus probable lorsque le marché local du travail est caractérisé par un faible taux de chômage. De plus, il est montré que la fréquence d'utilisation de bonis par les firmes américaines a augmenté au cours des 15 dernières années.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 98s-37.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:98s-37

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Keywords: Agency models; incomplete contracts; incentive pay; Modèles d'agence; contrats incomplets; réminération incitative;

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References

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  1. Charles Brown, 1990. "Firms' Choice of Method of Pay," NBER Working Papers 3065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
  3. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-93, March.
  4. Dye, Ronald A, 1985. "Costly Contract Contingencies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 233-50, February.
  5. Weitzman, Martin L, 1985. "Profit Sharing as Macroeconomic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 41-45, May.
  6. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. Moulton, Brent R., 1986. "Random group effects and the precision of regression estimates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 385-397, August.
  8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-21.
  10. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  11. MacLeod W. Bentley, 2002. "Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Heuristic Search," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-52, September.
  12. Robert Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  13. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics and the Form of Compensation," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-08, CIRANO.
  14. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Working Papers 1997-006, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Cited by:
  1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model," IEW - Working Papers 191, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. Alexopoulos, Michelle, 2007. "A monetary business cycle model with unemployment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3904-3940, December.
  3. Suvorov, Anton & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2009. "Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 665-681, November.
  4. Daniel Parent, 2001. "Incentive Pay in the United States: Its Determinants and Its Effects," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-04, CIRANO.
  5. Boyer, M. & Jacques, A. & Moreaux, M., 1998. "Better Observability Promotes the Adoption of more Flexible Technologies," Papers 98.505, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  6. Carstensen, Vivian, 2002. "The From-Tayloristic-to-Holistic-Organization Model From an Empirical Perspective," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-256, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  7. Jérôme Foulon & Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante, 1999. "Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or (and?) Information," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-11, CIRANO.
  8. Garen, John, 2006. "Use of employees and alternative work arrangements in the United States: a law, economics, and organizations perspective," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 107-141, February.

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