Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Firm Heterogeneity and Worker Self-Selection Bias Estimated Returns to Seniority

Contents:

Author Info

  • David N. Margolis

Abstract

I develop a model under which workers with different marginal productivities self-select into firms based on the firm's seniority reward policy. I show how this may bias upwards the estimates of returns to seniority in cross-sectional and even some longitudinal studies, when differences in workforce composition are ignored. I develop a new estimator of true returns to seniority and empirically test the implications of the model. I show how several previous estimation strategies over-estimate returns to seniority, particularly in firms that offer zero or negative returns to job seniority, using a large longitudinal sample of French firms and workers. Dans ce papier je décris un modèle d'embauches où les individus avec des productivités marginales hétérogènes se trouvent par autosélection, dans les entreprises avec des politiques de rémunération d'ancienneté différentes. Je montre comment ceci peut induire un biais positif dans les estimateurs de rendement de l'ancienneté basés sur les données en coupe transversales et même certains estimateurs basés sur les données longitudinales. Je décris un nouvel estimateur du vrai rendement de l'ancienneté, que j'utilise pour tester les implications du modèle. Je montre comment certaines autres approches surestiment les rendements de l'ancienneté, surtout dans les firmes qui rémunèrent très peu l'ancienneté, en utilisant une grande base de données longitudinales des employeurs et employés français.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/95s-04.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 95s-04.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:95s-04

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2020 rue University, 25e étage, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2A5
Phone: (514) 985-4000
Fax: (514) 985-4039
Email:
Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Hiring model; Seniority reward policy; Modèle d'embauche ; Rémunération d'ancienneté;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Andrew Weiss & Ruqu Wang, 1990. "A Sorting Model of Labor Contracts: Implications for Layoffs and Wage-Tenure Profiles," NBER Working Papers 3448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Abowd, J.M. & Kramarz, F. & Margolis, D.N., 1995. "High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 9503, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  3. Robert H. Topel, 1990. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority," NBER Working Papers 3294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Joseph G. Altonji & Robert A. Shakotko, 1985. "Do Wages Rise With Job Seniority?," NBER Working Papers 1616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Katharine G. Abraham & Henry S. Farber, 1986. "Job Duration, Seniority and Earnings," Working papers 407, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Boyer, Marcel, et al, 1995. "Sequential Location Equilibria under Incomplete Information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 323-50, July.
  7. Margolis, D..N., 1995. "Firm Heterogeneity and Worker Self-Selection Bias Estimated Returns to Seniority," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 9502, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  8. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  9. Salop, Joanne & Salop, Steven, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 619-27, November.
  10. Vogelsang, Timothy J & Perron, Pierre, 1998. "Additional Tests for a Unit Root Allowing for a Break in the Trend Function at an Unknown Time," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1073-1100, November.
  11. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Amigues, Jean-Pierre & Favard, Pascal & Gaudet, Gerard & Moreaux, Michel, 1998. "On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute Is Limited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 153-170, May.
  2. Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2008. "Do Initial Conditions Persist between Firms? An Analysis of Firm-Entry Cohort Effects and Job Losers Using Matched Employer-Employee Data," NBER Chapters, in: The Analysis of Firms and Employees: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, pages 135-162 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Touhami, A. & Martens, A., 1996. "Macroemesures in Computable General Equilibrium Models: a Probabilistic Treatment with an Application to Morocco," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 9621, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  4. Yves Sprumont, 1998. "On the Game-Theoretic Structure of Public-Good Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 455-472.
  5. Stefan Bender & Till von Wachter, 2006. "In the Right Place at the Wrong Time: The Role of Firms and Luck in Young Workers' Careers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1679-1705, December.
  6. David N. Margolis, 1995. "Firm Heterogeneity and Worker Self-Selection Bias Estimated Returns to Seniority," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 95s-04, CIRANO.
  7. Leonard, Jonathan S., 1999. "Bringing the firm back in," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 43-51, March.
  8. Lars Vilhuber, 1997. "Sector-Specific On-the-Job Training: Evidence from U.S. Data," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 97s-42, CIRANO.
  9. VILHUBERT, Lars, 1999. "Sector-Specific on-the-Job Training: Evidence from U.S. Data," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 9906, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:95s-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.