Estimating the Employer Switching Costs and Wage Responses of Forward-Looking Engineers
AbstractI estimate the relative magnitudes of worker switching costs and whether the employer switching of experienced engineers responds to outside wage offers. Institutional features imply that voluntary turnover dominates switching in the market for Swedish engineers from 1970 to 1990. I use data on the allocation of engineers across a large fraction of Swedish private sector firms to estimate the relative importance of employer wage policies and switching costs in a dynamic programming, discrete choice model of voluntary employer choice. The differentiated firms are modeled in employer characteristic space and each firm has its own age wage profile. I find that a majority of engineers have moderately high switching costs and that a minority of experienced workers are responsive to outside wage offers. Younger workers are more sensitive to outside wage offers than older workers.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 1113.
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Firestone Library, Princeton, New Jersey 08544-2098
Phone: 609 258-4041
Fax: 609 258-2907
Web page: http://www.irs.princeton.edu/
More information through EDIRC
monopsony papers; Sweden; Swendish firms; wages; engineers;
Other versions of this item:
- Jeremy T. Fox, 2010. "Estimating the Employer Switching Costs and Wage Responses of Forward-Looking Engineers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 357-412, 04.
- Jeremy T. Fox, 2009. "Estimating the Employer Switching Costs and Wage Responses of Forward-Looking Engineers," NBER Working Papers 15322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Alan Manning, 2010.
"Imperfect competition in the labour market,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
28729, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Ryan Monarch, 2014. ""It'S Not You, It'S Me": Breakups In U.S.-China Trade Relationships," Working Papers 14-08, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- Orley C. Ashenfelter & Henry Farber & Michael R. Ransom, 2010.
"Modern Models of Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Brief Survey,"
1223, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Ashenfelter, Orley & Farber, Henry & Ransom, Michael R., 2010. "Modern Models of Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Brief Survey," IZA Discussion Papers 4915, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Long).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.